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Abstract 
Using firm-level data from Changzhou, one of the representative prefectural cities in the 
Yangzi River Delta in China, we investigate the performances of both internal and external 
R&D in high-tech firms. We find that, on average, high-tech firms with more internal R&D 
expenditure apply for more patents in terms of both the total number of patents and the number 
of invention patents. Internal R&D is the most efficient in foreign firms, followed by private 
firms and then followed by SOEs (state-owned enterprises). These findings highlight the 
importance of privatizing high-tech firms in China if the Chinese government intends to 
accelerate industrial upgrading and convert the pattern of “Made in China” into “Created in 
China.” 
I. Introduction 
China is well-known for its fast economic growth during the last four decades. What is 
often omitted is that China also quite actively involved in research and development (R&D) 
activities. As shown in Table 1, according to the China Statistical Yearbook 2015, R&D 
expenditure at the national level as well as its ratio to GDP have been increasing fast. More than 
70% of the R&D expenditure pertains to industrial firms above scale. As a result, an increasing 
number of patent requests are submitted by industrial firms above scale. In 2014, R&D 
expenditure by industrial enterprises with total sale revenues of more than 20 million yuan was 
925.43 billion yuan, which accounts for an 11.1% increase from 2013. 
<Table 1> R&D activities in China 
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These facts are in line with the ambiguous vision of the Chinese government – to replace 
the label “Made in China” with “Created in China.” In order to achieve this goal, the Chinese 
government has selected some high-tech firms, believed to be the main force of the future for 
“Created in China.” As reported in Table 2, both the R&D expenditure and the number of 
patents applied for by high-tech firms increased rapidly between 2009 and 2014. In comparison 
with Table 1, among the industrial firms above scales, the larger share of R&D activities was 
conducted by above-scale high-tech firms, that is, in 2014, more than 20% of R&D expenditures 
by industrial firms above scale occurred in high-tech firms. 
<Table 2> R&D activities in high-tech firms in China 
By 2014, China had 27,939 high-tech firms, which spent 192.22 billion yuan on R&D in 
2014. High-tech firms receive preferential treatment such as reductions in business-income 
taxes, sales-tax exemptions for technology-transfer contracts, extra tax reductions for R&D 
expenditures as well as special government grants. Studying high-tech firms in China represents 
a good opportunity to further understand R&D efficiency in developing countries. According to 
Tables 1 and 2, for each billion yuan of R&D expenditures, industrial firms above scale apply 
for 425 patents, while high-tech firms apply for 625 patents. It induces that if we measure R&D 
performance by the number of patent applications, R&D activities by high-tech firms seem to be 
more important. 
A large number of existing studies focuses on R&D efficiency in both developed countries 
(Gao and Chou, 2015; Tsai and Wang, 2005) and developing countries (Hu, 2001; Seo et al., 
2012; Hosseini and Narayanan, 2014). Empirical studies on the R&D efficiency in Chinese 
firms usually rely on data from industrial firms at the firm level or industrial level (Zhang et al., 
2003; Zhang and Shi, 2011) or data from listed companies (Boeing et al., 2016). To our 
knowledge, Hu’s (2001) research on the R&D efficiency of high-tech firms in the Haidian 
District of Beijing, China, is the study most closely related to ours. Hu (2001) examines the link 
between its own (internal) R&D and productivity at the firm level as well as the heterogeneous 
effects of private and government R&D, respectively. The context of our empirical work is also 
high-tech firms in China, but we have a different research focus. 
In this paper, we measure the effectiveness of high-tech firms through their patent 
applications. Patent counts or patent to R&D are some of the measures of innovative 
performance employed in existing studies (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1990, 1991; Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996a, 1996b; Pavitt et al., 1987). Since Chinese government regards these measures 
as important measures of domestic firms’ competitiveness, high-tech firms are encouraged to 
apply for patents. As a result, high-tech firms apply for patents not only because they are 
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concerned about protecting their property rights, but also in order to fulfill the government’s 
requirements if they want to receive government funding aimed at stimulating R&D activities in 
high-tech firms. Hence, patent applications might just reflect high-tech firms’ efforts to obtain 
government funding rather than the effectiveness of their R&D. Further, we investigate the 
effectiveness of high-tech firms’ R&D through revenues from new products as well as the R&D 
effectiveness of firms with different ownership types. Another departure from Hu (2001) is that 
we distinguish two different kinds of R&D expenditure: internal and external. External R&D 
expenditure refers to payments to other firms; this can be firms to which a high-tech firm 
entrusts its R&D activity or a firm with which a high-tech firm cooperates. 
We find that high-tech firms’ internal R&D significantly correlates with the number of 
patents or the number of invention patents applied for. This, however, does not apply to external 
R&D. We interpret this finding as firms relying less on external R&D workers for patent 
application, since business secrets are at stake. As for high-tech firms’ with different ownership 
types, we find that return on internal R&D for private firms is lower than for foreign firms, but 
higher than for SOEs. Examining the revenue from new products further reveals that foreign 
high-tech firms are the most efficient with respect to internal R&D expenditures, while private 
firms are most efficient in seeking external R&D to generate more revenue from a new product.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and our 
empirical strategy. In Section 3, we present and discuss the results. Section 4 concludes. 
II. Data and empirical strategy 
Chinese government announced National Guideline of Medium and Long-term Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) in 2006. In March next year, National People’s Congress 
approved the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, where preferential 
treatment is provided to high-tech and new-tech firms under the key support of the state. In 
order to make the law more practicable, Administrative Measures for the Determination of High 
and New Tech Enterprises were approved by State council. The Torch High Industry 
Development Center under the Ministry of Science and Technology is the main official institute 
that is responsible for the determination of high and new tech firms. In practice, R&D intensity 
is the most important condition for determination of high and new tech enterprises and receiving 
preferential treatment, i.e., enterprise income tax reduction.  
The data in this study were obtained from surveys that cover all firms located in the 
National High-Tech and New-Tech Development Zones in China, or firms recognized as high-
tech firms in Changzhou, Jiangsu province, China. The survey is compiled yearly by the Torch 
High Industry Development Center under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and its goal 
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is to reinforce the overall technological innovation environment and promote high-tech 
industrialization in China. Department of Investigation and Statistics in the Torch Center is 
responsible for collecting data from high-tech firms in China. Our sample includes all high-tech 
firms in Changzhou, two county-level cities (Liyang and Jitang), and five districts (Gaoxing, 
Wujing, Tianling, Zhonglou, and Qiqu). We have 232, 233, and 235 firms in the sample for 
2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively, and 230 of these form a balanced three-year panel.  
Changzhou is a major industrial city in the Jiangsu province in the affluent Yangtze Delta 
Economic Region in China. It borders on the provincial capital of Nanjing to the west and it is 
not far from Shanghai, the main metropolis in the Yangtze Delta Region. In 2013, the R&D 
expenditures by industrial firms in the Jiangsu province with revenues above 20 million yuan 
were 1.24 billion yuan, which is the highest figure among all provinces in mainland China, 
accounting for 14.9% of the national total. Changzhou is representative of other large coastal 
cities in Eastern China, which account for a significant portion of the country’s R&D activities. 
According to the China City Competitiveness Annual (KPMG, 2010), it is one of the most 
competitive cities for private investment in China. Changzhou thus represents a good location 
for us to gain a deeper understanding of R&D activities in high-tech firms in China. 
Given the increasingly important role of high-tech firms in China as well as the active role 
of the Chinese government in industrial upgrading, the R&D effectiveness of high-tech firms 
with different ownership types might provide us with insights into the future of industrial 
upgrading in China and the importance of privatization of state-owned high-tech firms in China. 
Existing studies often use patents to refer to innovative performance (e. g., Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990, 1991; Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b Pavitt et al., 1987). We use the 
number of firms’ patents applications in the given year as one measure of firms’ R&D outcome. 
We use both the total number of patents applied for (patent) and the number of invention 
patents applied for (invent_patent). The number of invention patents is more difficult to obtain. 
Since firms holding more patents are more likely to maintain their identity as high-tech firms or 
be recognized as such, they may apply for patents only to formally meet the requirements of the 
government and get preferential treatment. In this sense, patent application may not necessarily 
be an effective measure for firms’ competitiveness. Hence, we further investigate the 
effectiveness of high-tech firms’ R&D through revenues from new products. New products are 
defined as products using new techniques, new design, or substantial improvement over former 
products in structure, material or techniques, and, as a result, the performance or function of the 
products is significantly upgraded. We use the revenue from new products (new_product), 
rather than the market value of new products, to highlight that new products should generate 
market demand and be purchased by consumers or other firms. 
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Firm-level R&D data are not available for many years, and hence, following Toivanen et al. 
(2002) and Nagaoka (2006), we use the flow value of R&D rather than its stock value. One of 
our main explanatory variables is R&D expenditure in the reporting year. In the dataset, we 
divide the firms’ total R&D expenditure into internal R&D and external R&D. External R&D 
expenditure refers to the amount that the firm paid to other firms for R&D activities that were 
outsourced or a result of cooperation. Our other main explanatory variable is the ownership type 
of the firm. We distinguish four different ownership types: SOEs, private firms, firms with 
investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT), and firms with foreign investment. 
We expect that, on average, firms with more internal R&D expenditures will have more patent 
applications, including invention patents. For foreign firms, we expect the marginal effect of 
R&D expenditure on the number of patents to be relatively higher. Because of the lower 
efficiency of SOEs, however, we also expect that this effect on the number of SOEs’ patents is 
relatively low. Since SOEs are less competitive and may be encouraged to apply for patents just 
to maintain their identity as high-tech firms, lower efficiency should also apply to the other 
dependent variable in our study – the revenue from new products,  
The effect of external R&D activities on patent application might be different from that of 
internal R&D activities. This is because, concerned about property-rights protection, firms 
might want to keep the whole R&D process a business secret before they apply for a patent. As 
a result, the marginal effect of external R&D on patent application may not be as significant as 
that of internal R&D. This argument, however, may not hold for the effect of external R&D on 
the revenue from new products. 
We employ two different regression models. Since the number of patent applications is 
left-censored to zero, we use a Tobit regression first. The fixed-effects Tobit model could be 
biased, thus, we use the random-effects model for our panel data. Furthermore, to consider time-
invariant unobservable factors, we use the fixed-effects model with our panel data. However, 
some firms do not have any revenue from new products. In such cases, we use the random-
effects Tobit model, followed by the fixed-effects model for panel data. As a robustness check, 
we lagged all the control variables for one or two years, capturing the fact that R&D investment 
to generating revenue from new products is a long process. 
The main explanatory variables include internal R&D expenditure (RDinput), external 
R&D expenditure or outsourced R&D expenditure (ORDinput), and dummies for ownership 
type, where SOE stands for state-owned enterprises, Private for private firms, HMT for firms 
with investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and Foreign for firms with foreign 
investment. The heterogeneous effect of R&D expenditures on patent application for firms with 
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different ownership types could be captured by the coefficient of the interaction terms between 
ownership type and R&D expenditure. As suggested by Brambor et al. (2006), we also calculate 
the marginal effect of R&D expenditure on the number of patent applications for different 
ownership types.  
Our control variables include firm-level characteristics and industry dummies at the 2-digit 
level. The number of R&D workers (RDworkers) is a proxy for the scale of R&D activities in 
the economy. Other controls include a dummy for whether the firm exports or not (export), 
whether the firm is located in a high-tech zone or not (zone). We use year dummies to control 
for factors that, year by year, affect the average R&D performance for high-tech firms with 
different ownership types. We report the descriptive statistics in Table 3.  
<Table 3> Descriptive statistics 
As for firms with different ownership types, we have 57 observations for SOEs (8.98% of 
all observations), 506 observations for private firms (79.69%), 33 observations for firms with 
investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (5.20%) and 39 observations for firms with 
foreign investment (6.14%). We treat private firms as the reference group since they represent 
the largest number of observations. 
III. Results 
First, we use a random-effects Tobit regression to investigate the effectiveness of R&D in 
the high-tech firms in the sample. We report the results in Table 4, where the dependent variable 
is the number of patent applications.  
<Table 4> Patent application –random-effects Tobit regression 
The results in Table 4 indicate that, on average, high-tech firms with more internal R&D 
expenditure apply for more patents. This does not hold for external R&D expenditure, however. 
Without considering the heterogeneous effect of firms’ different ownership types, Column (1) in 
Table 4 shows that, on average, SOEs apply for fewer patents compared with the reference 
group (private firms). Further evidence from Column (2) indicates that SOEs apply for fewer 
patents because their internal R&D is less efficient compared with private firms. Further, the 
interaction terms indicate that the internal R&D of foreign firms and the internal R&D of firms 
with investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are more efficient than that of private 
firms. Including year dummies uncovers the general trend of technological upgrading: on 
average, the number of patent applications by high-tech firms has been increasing. There is no 
significant correlation between patent applications and external R&D expenditure. After we add 
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the interaction terms between external R&D expenditure and ownership types, the basic results 
remain unaltered, as shown in Column (3). 
Next, since the Tobit model does not control for firm-level fixed effects and the results 
might hence be affected by the missing-variable bias, we use a fixed-effects model for our panel 
data. As expected, Column (1) of Table 5 shows that, on average, only internal R&D 
expenditure, rather than external R&D expenditure, significantly correlates with patent 
applications. In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, the significant and positive coefficient of 
RDinput indicates that private high-tech firms with more internal R&D expenditure apply for 
more patents. Further, the coefficients of the interaction terms show that the internal R&D of 
foreign high-tech firms is more efficient than that of private firms. The interaction term of SOE 
and RDinput is, however, only marginally significant.  
<Table 5> Patent applications – fixed-effects model 
Following Brambor et al. (2006), we take Column (3) in Tables 4 and 5 and calculate the 
marginal effects of R&D expenditures for different ownership types. We report the results in 
Table 6. External R&D has no significant impact on firms’ patent applications; however, for 
private and foreign high-tech firms more internal R&D results in more patent applications. For 
SOEs, the marginal effect of internal R&D on patent application is not significant in the Tobit 
model nor in the fixed-effects model. The marginal effect of firms with investment from Hong 
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan is not robustly significant. 
<Table 6> Marginal effects of R&D expenditure on patent applications 
Since an invention patent is more difficult to obtain, next, we study the determinants of 
invention-patent applications in more detail in Table 7. The results are comparable to the results 
reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
<Table 7> Invention-patent applications 
Following Columns (2) and (4) in Table 7, we calculate and report the marginal effects in 
Table 8. The basic results are the same as in Table 6. The marginal effects of external R&D are 
not always significant for firms with all ownership types. The marginal effects of internal R&D 
for both private and foreign firms are significantly positive; the magnitude of these effects is 
larger for foreign firms than for private firms. The marginal effect for firms with investment 
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan is, again, not robustly significant. 
<Table 8> Marginal effects of R&D expenditure on invention-patent applications 
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High-tech firms may, rather than to protect property rights, apply for patents only to meet 
the requirements imposed by the government to qualify as high-tech firms. Hence, we 
investigate whether more R&D expenditure results in more revenue from new products. The 
definition of a new product implies that high-tech firms are more likely to have more revenue 
from new products that resulted from competitive pressures. 
As shown in Column (1) of Table 9, on average, high-tech firms with more internal R&D 
or more external R&D have more revenue from new products. This is different from the 
previous regression results, where only the coefficient on internal R&D was significant. The 
explanation we offer is that firms might rely on external R&D for more new products, since it 
does not necessary relate to business secrets. Foreign firms are, again, more efficient in internal 
R&D compared with private firms. The coefficients of interaction terms between ownership and 
external R&D are difficult to explain (as we show below, the coefficients are not robust). 
Interestingly, the year dummies in Table 9 are no longer significant. This departure from 
previous results implies that although high-tech firms in China tend to apply for more patents 
each year, they do not show the same increasing ability in generating more revenue from new 
products.  
There also exists an alternative explanation of foreign firms outperforming in R&D 
efficiency since they may receive technical support from mother companies. We dropped some 
foreign firms whose mother companies are big brand, which are more able to provide technical 
support. The result is robust. Although we cannot fully deny this possibility, we would argue 
that it is more reasonable for the mother companies to hold patent by themselves and charge 
permission fees from FDI firms in China other than providing technical support to FDI firms in 
China and allowing FDI firms in China to apply their own patent.  
<Table 9> Revenue from new products 
Next, we check the robustness of the results reported in Table 9. Since revenue from new 
products may be generated only some time after the R&D investment was made, we lag all 
independent variables by one year in regressions reported in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 10. In 
Columns (2) and (4), all independent variables are lagged by two years; in these regressions, we 
only have cross-sectional data since the original data are a three-year panel. Hence, in Columns 
(2) and (4), we employ a Tobit model and an OLS model for cross-sectional data. For the sake 
of comparability, we use the same models in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 10 and include year 
dummies..  
<Table 10> Revenue from new products – robustness check 
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The basic result in Table 10 is the same when we use lagged dependent variables. Private 
high-tech firms with more internal and external R&D have more revenue from new products; 
the coefficients on linear terms of internal and external R&D are both significant and positive. 
Compared with private high-tech firms, SOEs are less efficient in converting R&D investment 
into revenue from new products and foreign high-tech firms are more efficient. The marginal 
effects are listed in Table 11, analogously to Tables 9 and 10.  
<Table 11> Marginal effects of R&D expenditure on revenue from new products 
The marginal effects from Table 11 indicate that, in terms of the revenue from new 
products, the internal R&D investment by foreign high-tech firms is the most efficient. For both 
private firms and SOEs, the marginal effects of their internal R&D investment on the revenue of 
new products are significant and positive. However, only for private high-tech firms is the 
marginal effect of external R&D investment on the revenue from new products significant, 
positive, and robust. 
We finally do robustness test by dropping some outliers, with the amount of patent applied 
or value of new products far beyond most of the observation. For example, we dropped 
observations with number of patent applied above 100, number of invention patent applied 
above 30 and revenue of new product above 50 million RMB. The results are shown in table A1 
and table A2 in appendix. Table A1 only reports marginal effect of internal R&D on both patent 
and invention patent applied. The basic results still hold compared with that in table 6 and table 
8. The marginal effect of SOEs is always not significant. Although the marginal effect of private 
firms loses some significance, the coefficient is still positive (and nearly significant). Table A2 
also provides the same results especially that the marginal effect of external R&D for private 
firms is always significantly positive. 
IV. Conclusions 
Based on firm-level data in Changzhou, a city representative of prefecture-level cities in 
the Yangzi River Delta in China, we examined the effectiveness of both internal and external 
R&D of high-tech firms. We found that, on average, high-tech firms with more internal R&D 
expenditure apply for more patents, both in terms of total patents and invention patents. 
Studying the marginal effects for firms with different ownership types showed that internal 
R&D makes foreign firms more efficient in patent application, followed by private firms and 
then followed by SOE. However, SOEs with more internal R&D expenditure do not apply for 
more patents. We found no significant correlation between external R&D and patent application. 
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The intuition behind this result is that firms might be reluctant to share innovation secrets 
pertaining to the R&D process with other firms. 
Further study on the revenue from new products indicates that both private firms and SOEs 
are less efficient than foreign firms with respect to internal R&D, while private firms are the 
most efficient in seeking external R&D and generate higher revenues from new products. 
If the Chinese government indeed intends to accelerate industrial upgrading and convert 
the pattern of “Made in China” into “Created in China,” these findings highlight the importance 
of privatizing high-tech firms in China. Given that FDI has a positive spillover effect on 
domestic firms in developing countries, this also implies that industrial upgrading of Chinese 
firms should be accompanied by economic openness. 
Our study has several limitations. Our sample is only representative of the developed 
regions in China, rather than of all regions nationwide. The time horizon is also limited, hence, 
we were not able to study the lagged effect of R&D on patent application in more detail. The 
role of HMT high-tech firms also requires further study, as we were unable to disentangle all 
influences.  
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Table 1 R&D activities in China 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total R&D expenditure 
(billion yuan) 580.21 706.26 868.70 1029.84 1184.66 1301.56 
R&D expenditure / GDP (%) 1.68 1.73 1.79 1.93 2.01 2.05 
R&D expenditure by industrial 
firms above scale 
(billion yuan) 
377.57 - 599.38 720.06 831.84 925.43 
Number of patent applied by 
industrial firms above scale 
(item) 
166762 198890 265612 327116 359791 393480 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2015, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Table 2 R&D activities of high-tech firms in China 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
R&D expenditure 
(billion yuan) 
77.41 96.78 123.78 149.15 173.44 192.22 
Number of patent applied 
(item) 
51513 59683 77725 97200 102532 120077 
 
 
Table 3 descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
patent 702 piece 7.54 17.56 0 278 
invent_patent 702 Piece 2.25 7.36 0 138 
new_product 702 100 million 
RMB 
1.55 5.84 0 109.77 
RDinput 702 1 million RMB 15.47 44.12 0.25 868.52 
ORDinput 702 1 million RMB 0.70 2.59 0 37 
RDworkers 702 Person 70.50 103.42 0 1099 
export 702 - 0.60 0.50 0 1 
zone 702 - 0.43 0.50 0 1 
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Table 4 patent application (random effect tobit regression) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RDinput 0.236*** 0.192*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0432) (0.0439) 
ORDinput -0.236 -0.252 -0.182 
 (0.253) (0.241) (0.247) 
Ownership type    
SOE -5.729** 2.574 3.371 
 (2.644) (2.991) (3.120) 
HMT 7.818** -4.861 -8.233* 
 (3.257) (4.160) (4.364) 
Foreign 2.870 0.351 1.027 
 (2.991) (2.899) (2.992) 
SOE*RDinput  -0.281*** -0.274*** 
  (0.0743) (0.0740) 
HTM*RDinput  1.041*** 1.063*** 
  (0.242) (0.239) 
Foreign*RDinput  0.129** 0.148** 
  (0.0588) (0.0622) 
SOE*ORDinput   -0.718 
   (0.922) 
HTM*ORDinput   43.41** 
   (18.91) 
Foreign*ORDinpu
t 
  -0.940 
   (1.151) 
RDworkers 0.00934 0.0192** 0.0215** 
 (0.00811) (0.00812) (0.00900) 
export   0.253 1.025 0.924 
 (1.527) (1.421) (1.409) 
zone -3.109** -1.834 -1.629 
 (1.526) (1.393) (1.384) 
year_2009 2.984** 2.850** 2.838** 
 (1.397) (1.401) (1.409) 
year_2010 5.071*** 4.664*** 4.608*** 
 (1.415) (1.421) (1.427) 
industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -5.428 -6.925 -7.158 
 (7.564) (6.812) (6.737) 
Observations 635 635 635 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5 patent application (fixed effect model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
RDinput 0.344*** 0.250*** 0.252*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0817) (0.0819) 
ORDinput -0.347 -0.408 -0.437 
 (0.387) (0.385) (0.392) 
Ownership type    
SOE -2.155 3.221 2.413 
 (8.881) (9.473) (10.70) 
HMT 3.660 6.157 2.259 
 (8.551) (8.921) (9.648) 
Foreign 5.554 0.861 -1.830 
 (7.294) (7.443) (8.245) 
SOE*RDinput  -0.157 -0.161 
  (0.170) (0.171) 
HTM*RDinput  -0.418 -0.382 
  (0.409) (0.415) 
Foreign*RDinput  0.168* 0.163* 
  (0.0978) (0.0983) 
SOE*ORDinput   0.378 
   (1.481) 
HTM*ORDinput   21.52 
   (23.66) 
Foreign*ORDinpu
t 
  1.382 
   (1.806) 
RDworkers 0.0248 0.0306 0.0284 
 (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0191) 
export   1.282 0.944 0.895 
 (3.247) (3.235) (3.243) 
zone 1.029 0.406 0.356 
 (10.48) (10.42) (10.45) 
year_2009 2.873* 2.679* 2.766* 
 (1.535) (1.532) (1.550) 
year_2010 5.007*** 4.934*** 5.036*** 
 (1.550) (1.545) (1.565) 
Constant -83.87** -117.9*** -3.845 
 (32.51) (35.88) (29.67) 
R-squared 0.221 0.238 0.240 
Observations 635 635 635 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 marginal effects of R&D expenditure on patent application 
Ownership 
type 
internal R&D external R&D 
Tobit 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
Tobit 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
SOE -0.088 
(0.066) 
0.092 
(0.151) 
-0.900 
(0.906) 
-0.059 
(1.466) 
Private 0.186*** 
(0.044) 
0.252** 
(0.082) 
-0.182 
(0.247) 
-0.437 
(0.392) 
HMT 1.249*** 
(0.236) 
-0.129 
(0.407) 
43.226**
(18.908) 
21.082 
(23.658) 
Foreign 0.335*** 
(0.042) 
0.415*** 
(0.054) 
-1.121 
(1.132) 
0.945 
(1.818) 
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Table 7 invention patent application  
 
 Tobit model Fixed effect model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RDinput 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0351) (0.0350) 
ORDinput -0.119 -0.111 -0.244 -0.260 
 (0.0941) (0.0973) (0.165) (0.168) 
Ownership type     
SOE 1.304 1.465 0.914 1.424 
 (1.134) (1.191) (4.067) (4.572) 
HMT -1.393 -2.202 1.650 -0.231 
 (1.575) (1.666) (3.830) (4.124) 
Foreign -1.234 -1.209 0.522 -2.539 
 (1.110) (1.151) (3.196) (3.524) 
SOE*RDinput -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.0780 -0.0871 
 (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0728) (0.0731) 
HTM*RDinput 0.0693 0.0705 -0.176 -0.179 
 (0.0903) (0.0902) (0.175) (0.177) 
Foreign*RDinput 0.0579** 0.0594** 0.109*** 0.107** 
 (0.0234) (0.0249) (0.0420) (0.0420) 
SOE*ORDinput  -0.139  0.108 
  (0.365)  (0.633) 
HTM*ORDinput  11.30  7.360 
  (7.647)  (10.11) 
Foreign*ORDinput  -0.0383  1.554** 
  (0.468)  (0.772) 
RDworkers 0.00286 0.00328 0.0109 0.0101 
 (0.00313) (0.00353) (0.00801) (0.00818) 
export   0.0536 0.0202 -0.765 -0.775 
 (0.547) (0.546) (1.389) (1.386) 
zone -0.498 -0.444 -4.155 -4.185 
 (0.523) (0.525) (4.475) (4.465) 
year_2009 1.052* 1.056* 0.900 0.913 
 (0.585) (0.589) (0.658) (0.663) 
year_2010 2.029*** 2.031*** 2.012*** 2.045*** 
 (0.593) (0.596) (0.663) (0.669) 
Constant -0.975 -1.018 -
60.27*** 
-4.560 
 (2.545) (2.542) (15.41) (12.68) 
R-square   0.327 0.335 
Observations 635 635 635 635 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 marginal effects of R&D expenditure on invention patent application 
Ownership 
type 
internal R&D external R&D 
Tobit model Fixed effect 
model 
Tobit model Fixed effect 
model 
SOE -0.018 
(0.026) 
0.039 
(0.064) 
-0.250 
(0.359) 
-0.152 
(0.627) 
Private 0.109*** 
(0.017) 
0.126*** 
(0.035) 
-0.111 
(0.097) 
-0.260 
(0.168) 
HMT 0.179** 
(0.090) 
-0.053 
(0.174) 
11.192 
(7.647) 
7.100 
(10.112) 
Foreign 0.168*** 
(0.017) 
0.233*** 
(0.023) 
-0.150 
(0.459) 
1.294 
(0.777) 
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Table 9 revenue of new product 
 Tobit model Fixed effect 
model 
(1) (2) 
RDinput 0.0671*** 0.0240*** 
 (0.00696) (0.00693) 
ORDinput 0.118*** 0.0955*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0331) 
Ownership type   
SOE 0.385 -0.836 
 (0.514) (0.905) 
HMT 0.370 0.178 
 (0.603) (0.816) 
Foreign 0.00167 -0.204 
 (0.461) (0.697) 
SOE*RDinput -0.00383 -0.00646 
 (0.0110) (0.0145) 
HTM*RDinput -0.0785** -0.0298 
 (0.0307) (0.0351) 
Foreign*RDinput 0.0552*** 0.0934*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00832) 
SOE*ORDinput -0.435*** -0.410*** 
 (0.112) (0.125) 
HTM*ORDinput 0.295 1.177 
 (2.019) (2.001) 
Foreign*ORDinput -0.315** -0.262* 
  (0.153) 
RDworkers 0.00610**
* 
-0.000490 
 (0.00124) (0.00162) 
export   0.338* 0.132 
 (0.204) (0.274) 
zone -0.725*** 0.315 
 (0.249) (0.883) 
year_2009 0.0218 0.00755 
 (0.135) (0.131) 
year_2010 0.171 0.177 
 (0.137) (0.132) 
Constant -1.505 2.694 
 (1.300) (2.509) 
R-squared  0.874 
Observations 635 635 
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Table 10 revenue of new product (robustness check) 
 
 Tobit model OLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RDinput 0.0743**
* 
0.0548*** 0.0744** 0.0551** 
 (0.00765) (0.00957) (0.0299) (0.0228) 
ORDinput 0.252*** 0.628*** 0.240** 0.611*** 
 (0.0524) (0.122) (0.105) (0.196) 
Ownership type     
SOE -0.0182 0.00752 -0.0141 0.00954 
 (0.0131) (0.0189) (0.0318) (0.0296) 
HMT -0.0983* -0.162* -
0.0878** 
-0.135** 
 (0.0542) (0.0826) (0.0357) (0.0614) 
Foreign 0.168*** 0.205*** 0.160*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0271) (0.0355) (0.0584) 
SOE*RDinput -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.0780 -0.0871 
 (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0728) (0.0731) 
HTM*RDinput 0.0693 0.0705 -0.176 -0.179 
 (0.0903) (0.0902) (0.175) (0.177) 
Foreign*RDinput 0.0579** 0.0594** 0.109*** 0.107** 
 (0.0234) (0.0249) (0.0420) (0.0420) 
SOE*ORDinput -0.209 -0.728*** -0.105 -0.626** 
 (0.159) (0.215) (0.221) (0.282) 
HTM*ORDinput -5.185 -6.605 -4.683* -5.427** 
 (3.959) (4.373) (2.448) (2.334) 
Foreign*ORDinput 0.179 4.746*** 0.175 4.151*** 
 (0.219) (0.648) (0.341) (1.356) 
RDworkers 0.00923*
** 
0.0129*** 0.00818*
** 
0.0106*** 
 (0.00162) (0.00227) (0.00311) (0.00310) 
export   0.608** -0.0336 0.367 -0.0820 
 (0.258) (0.366) (0.260) (0.299) 
zone -0.837*** -1.047*** -
0.565*** 
-0.813*** 
 (0.252) (0.351) (0.201) (0.299) 
year_2009 0.195  0.156  
 (0.233)  (0.187)  
Constant -2.225* -0.357 -1.952** -0.185 
 (1.163) (1.579) (0.989) (0.854) 
R-square / Pseudo R2 0.3502 0.3919 0.911 0.935 
Observations 427 206 427 206 
Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 marginal effects of R&D expenditure on revenue of new products 
Ownership 
type 
internal R&D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE 0.063*** 
(0.010) 
0.056***
(0.012) 
0.062***
(0.017) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.060*** 
(0.020) 
0.065*** 
(0.018) 
Private 0.067*** 
(0.007) 
0.074***
(0.008) 
0.055***
(0.010) 
0.024***
(0.007) 
0.074**
(0.030) 
0.055** 
(0.023) 
HMT -0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.024 
(0.054) 
-0.107 
(0.083) 
-0.006 
(0.034) 
-0.013 
(0.035) 
-0.080 
(0.056) 
Foreign 0.122*** 
(0.004) 
0.243***
(0.012) 
0.260***
(0.026) 
0.117***
(0.005) 
0.234*** 
(0.020) 
0.269*** 
(0.053) 
Owners
hip type 
external R&D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE -
0.317*** 
(0.110) 
0.043 
(0.153) 
-0.100 
(0.181) 
-0.314**
(0.124) 
0.135 
(0.201) 
-0.015 
(0.191) 
Private 0.118*** 
(0.030) 
0.252***
(0.052) 
0.628***
(0.122) 
0.096***
(0.033) 
0.240**
(0.105) 
0.611*** 
(0.196) 
HMT 0.413 
(2.019) 
-4.933 
(3.958) 
-5.977 
(4.371) 
1.273 
(2.001) 
-4.443* 
(2.438) 
-4.817** 
(2.320) 
Foreign -0.196 
(0.130) 
0.431**
(0.213) 
5.374***
(0.635) 
-0.166 
(0.154) 
0.415 
(0.327) 
4.762*** 
(1.340) 
Note: Column (1) is calculated according to column (1) in table 9. Column (2) is calculated 
according to column (1) in table 10. Column (3) is calculated according to column (2) in table 
10. Column (4) is calculated according to column (2) in table 9. Column (5) is calculated 
according to column (3) in table 10. Column (6) is calculated according to column (4) in table 
10. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 marginal effects of internal R&D expenditure on patent application 
Ownership 
type 
patent application invention patent application 
Tobit 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
Tobit 
model 
Fixed effect 
model 
SOE -0.058 
(0.043) 
0.021 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.026) 
Private 0.022 
(0.028) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.021***
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
HMT 0.773*** 
(0.151) 
0.006 
(0.232) 
0.033 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.066) 
Foreign 0.131*** 
(0.048) 
0.023 
(0.22) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
0.034 
(0.063) 
 
 
Table A2 marginal effects of R&D expenditure on revenue of new products 
Ownership 
type 
internal R&D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE 0.063*** 
(0.010) 
0.055***
(0.011) 
0.065***
(0.015) 
0.025* 
(0.013) 
0.059*** 
(0.020) 
0.066*** 
(0.018) 
Private 0.067*** 
(0.007) 
0.074***
(0.008) 
0.055***
(0.009) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.071** 
(0.029) 
0.054** 
(0.021) 
HMT -0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.038 
(0.053) 
-0.131* 
(0.075) 
-0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.030 
(0.035) 
-0.122** 
(0.055) 
Foreign 0.117*** 
(0.010) 
0.113***
(0.030) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
0.176*** 
(0.033) 
0.089*** 
(0.034) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
Owners
hip type 
external R&D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOE -0.314*** 
(0.111) 
0.022 
(0.149) 
-0.087 
(0.165) 
-0.321*** 
(0.124) 
0.052 
(0.190) 
-0.044 
(0.196) 
Private 0.119*** 
(0.030) 
0.249***
(0.051) 
0.640***
(0.111) 
0.097*** 
(0.033) 
0.236** 
(0.104) 
0.613*** 
(0.190) 
HMT 0.425 
(2.025) 
-5.248 
(3.836) 
-5.949 
(3.977) 
1.012 
(2.000) 
-4.829* 
(2.605) 
-5.285** 
(2.389) 
Foreign -0.158 
(0.146) 
0.186 
(0.212) 
0.440***
(0.955) 
-0.159 
(0.153) 
0.149* 
(0.085) 
-0.347 
(0.520) 
 
